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1. INTRODUCTION  
A wave of substantial financial disintegration has been observed during the recent financial crisis.  
While gross capital flows declined sharply in general (e.g., Broner et al., 2013), the decline has 
been particularly steep for banking flows among developed economies (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 
2011). The literature shows evidence of a flight home effect in syndicated bank loans (Giannetti 
and Laeven, 2012a) and of financial protectionism in bank lending (Rose and Wieladek, 2014). 
We also observe that global banks have increased the use of their local currency in their lending 
(e.g., Ivashina et al., 2015). In this context it is surprising that dollar borrowing by many 
Eurozone (EZ) non-financial corporates increased dramatically from an average of 5 billion USD 
during 2004-2006 to a peak of 40 billion in 2008 (solid red line in Figure 1). While the 
proportion of dollar borrowing was about 5% in 2004-2006, it increased to 35% for non-
investment grade borrowers and to 15% for investment grade borrowers in the second half of 
2008 (Figure 2).1 Importantly, we do not observe a similar pattern in bonds. The increase in 
dollar bond issuance was rather transitory (it lasted on average 1 quarter) and much smaller (4 
percentage points for investment grade firms and 8 percentage points for non-investment grade 
firms).  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The purpose of this paper is to document this surprising episode in international banking flows 
and identify the factors that led to that development. We argue that the increase in dollar 
borrowing by EZ leveraged2 firms can be explained by the distinct reaction of EZ and US banks 





these reactions are related to two main (and perhaps related) symptoms of the global financial 
crisis: the domestic credit crunch and the drying up of global interbank markets. Figure 1 depicts 
a high positive correlation between the amount of dollar debt issued by EZ corporates and an 
indicator of the tightness of the EZ credit supply.3  
Our baseline sample includes quarterly syndicated loan issuances obtained from Thomson-
Reuters Dealscan for the period Q1-2004 to Q4-2009. We observe the nationality of lead lenders 
and the currency denomination of loans. In our baseline setting we define non-EZ banks as 
arrangers headquartered outside the EZ. Moreover, we define a non-EZ bank loan as a syndicated 
loan with at least one arranger bank located outside of the EZ; alternatively, we measure the 
participation of non-EZ banks by their percentage in a syndicate. 
During the financial crisis, US banks partly replaced EZ banks in loans to riskier firms. A 
potential explanation is the difference in banking regulation. During this period and until 2014 
US lenders operated fully under Basel I, while EZ banks were under Basel II.4 Under the Basel I 
framework, the risk weight on risky and safe corporate debt is the same. This means that US 
banks had greater incentive than EZ banks to load onto risky corporate debt as their capital 
position deteriorated due to subprime losses.5 Another difference for US banks is that they 
received capital support from the US government earlier than other banks. However, the first 
wave of capital injection took place in Q4-2008 which is later than the shift toward US credit and 
dollar borrowing we document.  
Regarding the shift towards dollar, the explanation we test is that higher dollar borrowing during 





EZ banks and an increase in the relative cost of funding in euro they face. In sum, the domestic 
credit crunch pushes risky firms to borrow from non-EZ banks and the coincident disruption in 
the euro interbank market pushes non-EZ banks reliant on wholesale funding away from lending 
in euro. We also show that an increase in the cost of swapping euro into dollar, caused by the 
drying up of unsecured dollar funding, leads EZ firms to increase their demand for foreign dollar 
credit.  
We decompose our empirical analysis into three steps. In a first step, we verify that non-EZ 
banks’ credit to riskier EZ firms is countercyclical: when EZ banks tighten lending standards, 
riskier borrowers are more likely to obtain a loan from a non-EZ bank rather than from a EZ 
bank. We find that this effect at the intensive and extensive margins is mostly attributable to US 
banks and that it is significant even when we account for changes in the stance of US monetary 
policy.  
In a second step, we analyze the differences in the choice of currency between risky and safe 
borrowers during the credit crunch in relation to variations in the cost of funding in the euro 
interbank market (the Euribor-OIS spread) and the cost of swapping euro into dollar - the 
deviation from covered interest parity (the euro basis). The switch to dollar borrowing sourced 
from non-EZ banks is significant for risky firms in export-intensive sectors. 
Third, we ask whether this matters in real terms: we assess the real effect of non-EZ banking 
using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables to correct for unobservable differences 
between borrowers with and without a non-EZ bank relationship. We report relevant statistical 





constraints of EZ firms: during the credit contraction of 2007-2009, riskier EZ firms exposed to a 
weak EZ lender pay a lower spread on new loans issued and do not cut employment when they 
have also a prior relationship with a non-EZ bank.6 
We specify a linear model with firm fixed effects for the choice among different sources of 
finance and among different currencies. The fact that we focus on within-firm shifts between 
different sources of finance and different currencies (i.e., compositional changes rather than 
levels) means that our results cannot be driven by changes in the population of firms tapping 
different forms of finance over time or by changes in the aggregate demand for debt. The effects 
we document are also for the same reason not related to changes over time in the capacity of 
firms to raise debt. One caveat is if firms decide to shift to foreign banks or foreign currency for 
reasons other than the drying up of credit at home. For example, they could shift the composition 
of their borrowing if foreign banks lend cheaper or if rates on dollar loans are lower than euro 
rates. To control for these alternative explanations, we include in our model a battery of 
indicators that capture credit conditions in the US and the stance of monetary policy in the US. 
Further, the fact that we focus on EZ countries means that our results cannot be driven by 
differences in the stance of monetary policy or nominal exchange rate expectations across 
countries.  
Literature Review 
There is a growing literature analyzing cross-border banking during the recent financial crisis 
(e.g., Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, Claessens, 2017).  In particular, the evidence indicates that 





Calderon and Kubota, 2012) so that foreign borrowing, typically in foreign currency, declines 
sharply in a credit crunch.7 This is also true for syndicated loans after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse (De Haas and Van Horen, 2012). The dampening impact of foreign lending that we 
document in this paper therefore contrasts with the existing evidence.  
Our findings on the role of cross-border banks extend earlier work by Haselmann and Watchel 
(2011) and Bruno and Hauswald (2014). Haselmann and Watchel (2011) document that foreign 
banks (banks headquartered outside the borrower home country) play a prominent role in the 
syndicated loan market and that they lend more to riskier borrowers in developed markets. They 
however do not study the role of foreign banks during a crisis. Using country-level data, Bruno 
and Hauswald (2014) find a positive effect of foreign banks’ presence on real growth and this 
effect is stronger during banking crises and in contexts where informational and legal frictions 
loom larger, hindering firms’ access to credit. Our firm-level data allow for a better identification 
of the channel through which the presence of foreign banks alters firm performance during a 
crisis.  
Our paper extends three other strands of literature: (1) on the reshaping of corporate financing 
during a credit crunch; (2) on the drivers of foreign currency credit; and (3) on the real effects of 
the 2007-2009 credit crunch. The first strand of literature includes Ivashina and Becker (2014) 
who find that EZ corporates increased their reliance on the bond market in response to the 
contraction of bank credit. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) study the effect of a credit contraction 
on the forms of financing in a model where firms are heterogeneous in their net worth. In line 





quality. De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) develop a general equilibrium model with firms that differ in 
their risk of default that can replicate the aggregate shift from bank finance to bond finance 
witnessed in Europe since 2009. But these models do not allow for foreign bank lending as an 
alternative source of financing. 
The literature on foreign currency borrowing or lending focuses on emerging markets in the 
context of financial crises.8 The empirical evidence shows that firms are more likely to borrow in 
foreign currency when they are exporters or with large cross-currency interest differentials (e.g., 
Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001, McCauley et al., 2015, Brown, Kirschenman and Ongena, 2014, 
Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin, 2011). However, there is little work on advanced economies. For the 
recent financial crisis, an exception is Ivashina et al. (2015) who find that EZ banks reduced their 
dollar lending.  
The growing literature on the real consequences of the 2007-2009 credit crunch includes 
Chodorow-Reich (2013); Bentolila et al. (2018), and Haltenhof et al. (2014) who study the 
impact on employment; and Cingano et al. (2016) who also analyze the effect on investment.9 
Like our paper, all these papers find a significant effect on employment exploiting micro (firm or 
industry) level data. But none of these papers studies the mitigating role of foreign banks which 
is the focus of this paper.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data sources and gives 
a historical background of the twin crises in the credit market and in funding markets. Section 3 





channels. Section 4 reports an analysis of the real effect of the credit crisis and of the mitigating 
role of non-EZ banks. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. BACKGROUND FACTS AND DATA  
This section documents our data sources and provides a descriptive analysis of the changing 
lending behavior of EZ and non-EZ banks during the credit crunch. We then provide a historical 
overview of the difficulties that EZ banks encountered as a consequence of large exposures to the 
US subprime meltdown and the associated freeze in the asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
market contaminating interbank and swap markets. Our model will then show that the coincident 
drying up of liquidity in euro wholesale funding markets or in swap markets creates the 
conditions for an increase in dollar borrowing relative to euro borrowing. 
 
2.1. The Role of non-Eurozone Banks and the Importance of Dollar Credit in the Eurozone 
Syndicated Loan Market 
Our benchmark sample covers the quarterly syndicated loan issuance activity of EZ non-financial 
corporates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal that syndicated loans are a significant 
source of financing for European firms, accounting for about a third of all financing at of the end 
of our sample period.10  To understand the sharp increase in dollar borrowing during the 2007-





The data source for syndicated loans is Thomson-Reuters Dealscan. As is common in the 
literature, we consider loans to be issued by the lead arrangers. Syndicated loans are often 
subscribed by more than one lead bank, but we do not observe the contribution of each lead bank. 
As a proxy for the amount extended by non-EZ banks we calculate the proportion of non-EZ 
arrangers to the total number of arrangers in the syndicate, as is standard in the literature. Non-EZ 
loans are defined as syndicated loans underwritten by at least one lead arranger headquartered 
outside the EZ. Further, for each loan we observe the amount, the currency denomination, the 
spread to benchmark at issuance (partially populated), calculate the maturity of the loan in 
months, and can separate real investment purpose loans and loans raised for other purposes such 
as mainly refinancing and restructuring purposes (leveraged-buyouts, mergers and acquisitions). 
We include both term loans and credit lines.  Our dataset is organized as a panel of firm-quarter 
observations with positive debt issuance. More than 25 percent of the loans issued in our sample 
are risky, i.e. rated below investment grade.11  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 reports the number of borrowers by country. Out of 3594 firms with a positive demand 
for credit, 1511 firms borrow from non-EZ banks, and 307 firms issue dollar loans during our 
sample period.12 The number of borrowers is broadly proportional to country size. For the 
regressions, we consider firms that issue more than one loan during our sample period. There are 
795 of these firms, of which 556 have ever borrowed from a non-EZ bank and 105 have 
borrowed in dollar. Table 2 gives the distribution of credit supplied by lender nationality before 





tapping the market over time, we focus only on firms that borrow in both periods. We observe 
several interesting facts. First of all, US banks are the largest foreign participants in the EZ 
market. Second, unlike all other lenders, US banks have a larger participation in the leveraged 
segment of the market than in the investment grade segment of the market: 28% for leveraged 
loans against 9% for investment grade loans during the credit crunch, consistent with the fact that 
being under Basel I gives US banks a greater incentive to load onto riskier corporate debt. Third 
and most importantly, while EZ banks have reduced their participation in the leveraged segment 
of the market from 51% to 46% during the credit crunch, non-EZ banks, and most notably US 
banks, have increased their participation substantially from 49% to 54%. Last but not least, for all 
non-EZ banks, but again most notably US banks, we observe a dramatic increase in the 
proportion of credit denominated in US dollar. During the crisis 42% of US banks’ loans are in 
US dollars against 11% before the crisis.  
[Table 2 about here] 
These observations are confirmed at the level of individual banks, comparing the lending 
behavior of the same bank over time. In Table 3 we list the largest non-EZ lenders for which we 
calculate the percentage of their total lending (based on prorated figures) extended to risky EZ 
borrowers and the percentage of their total lending denominated in US dollar before and after the 
crisis. Overall, we see that US banks increase risk while UK and Japanese banks reduce risk 
during the credit crunch. And for all the banks we observe an increase in the percentage of 
lending denominated in US dollars, albeit stronger at US banks. 






2.2. The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis in Europe 
The first signs of the eruption of the US subprime crisis in Europe date back to February 2007 
when HSBC announced unexpected losses of 10.5 billion USD and fired the head of its US 
mortgage lending business. European banks were directly involved in the US subprime market. 
This is true of all important participants in the syndicated loan market like Deutsche Bank and 
French banks Société Générale and BNP Paribas.  According to Acharya and Schnabl (2009), 
European banks, notably German, Dutch, Belgian, and French banks, were large sponsors of 
structured investment vehicles (SIV’s) and conduits. This shadow business was heavily invested 
in US dollar denominated subprime assets, mainly financed through the issuance of asset backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) in US dollar. When the ABCP market came to an abrupt halt in 
August 2007,13 banks were forced to take assets from SIV’s and conduits back on their balance 
sheets. As the value of US subprime assets plummeted, banks experienced large losses. The first 
banks that required support from their governments were not US banks but German banks IKS, 
Deutsche Industriebank, and Sachsen Landesbank. In August 2008 Bayern LB and IKB reported 
losses above 10 billion USD, more than what their capital position could support.  
As losses depleted capital, European banks tightened lending standards, leading to a sharp decline 
in the volume of activity in the syndicated loan market. Figure 1 shows the net percentage of EZ 
banks that report having tightened their lending standard for large firms in the past 3 months, 
average across all EZ countries.14  There are important variations in this indicator over the 





percentile. Variations across countries (not shown) are important as well with an earlier, more 
persistent, and deeper tightening of lending standards in southern EZ countries. Syndicated loan 
issuance activity declined rapidly and persistently across all EZ countries irrespective of the 
purpose of the debt issued.  
Growing uncertainty about the extent of subprime assets banks held on their balance sheet, the 
magnitude of the losses, and whether banks had enough capital to bear these losses, spread the 
crisis immediately to interbank markets. Banks became increasingly reluctant to lend to each 
other due to mounting counterparty risk and fear about their own ability to raise funding in the 
future. The global interbank market crisis reached a state of panic when Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy in September 2008 and most unsecured sourced of funding eroded. Figure 3 
depicts large spikes in the cost of funding in the euro and the dollar unsecured interbank markets 
measured by the difference between Euribor (or Libor USD) and overnight index swap spreads.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 The inability to roll-over ABCP funding then put pressure on the banks to find new sources of 
funding: being unable to raise dollar funding in the interbank market and facing growing needs to 
fund their dollar denominated assets European banks turned to foreign exchange swaps, a secured 
form of funding. The surge in the demand for exchanging euros for dollars --synthetic dollar 
funding-- combined with limited capacity on the part of arbitrageurs15 caused repeated deviations 
from covered interest parity. This is shown in Figure 4 which plots the deviation from CIP, the 
euro basis (the cost of synthetic dollar funding), computed using 3-month Euribor, dollar Libor 





in Q4-2009 helped restore orderly conditions in funding and credit markets until the eruption of 
the sovereign debt crisis. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3. THE LENDING BEHAVIOR OF NON-EUROZONE BANKS DURING 
THE CREDIT CRUNCH 
The analysis focuses on non-investment grade firms, called Risky. Our explanation for the 
increase in dollar borrowing by Risky firms is based on the combination of two hypotheses. The 
Appendix provides the theoretical support for these hypotheses. First, the reduction in banks 
capital at the onset of the financial crisis leads to a Home credit crunch. This increases the market 
share of Foreign banks, so that Risky firms switch from Home to Foreign banks with a higher 
appetite for risk. Foreign banking may be associated with higher dollar borrowing. The second 
hypothesis is that the drying up of liquidity in euro wholesale markets leads Foreign banks to 
shift to dollar as they have low deposits in euro. Moreover, the drying up of liquidity in euro 
interbank markets and dollar swap market makes dollar borrowing more attractive, especially for 
those EZ firms that have a high share of foreign income. This amplifies the positive relationship 
that may exist between borrowing from Foreign banks and borrowing in dollar. 
We test this explanation in two steps. First, we examine how the distribution of credit between 
EZ and non-EZ banks and its currency composition change during the credit crunch. Second, we 





of loans. We document these effects separately for non-EZ banks that presumably have large euro 
deposits and for other foreign banks (notably, US banks).  
 
3.1 The Shift to non-Eurozone Banks 
We use the following baseline regression:  
   𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡1 = 𝑐1 + 𝜃𝑖1 + 𝛾𝑡1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                   (1) 
The left-hand side variable is the proportion of non-EZ banks in the syndicate. 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑡 is the net 
percentage of EZ banks that report in the ECB survey having tightened credit to large firms in the 
past three months. Importantly, according to the same survey banks tighten credit standards due 
to higher cost of capital and limited access to market funding, but never mention competition 
from foreign banks as a reason for tightening credit standards.17 𝜃𝑖1 are firm fixed effects and 𝛾𝑡1 
time fixed effects.18 Risky is a dummy that indicates whether the loan is rated below investment 
grade or not rated in a given quarter.  
We are interested in identifying the effect of a reduction in the credit supply on the demand for 
non-EZ credit. Therefore we also include 𝑋𝑗𝑡 which is a vector of variables that capture changes 
in the supply of non-EZ credit and in the demand for dollar: interaction terms of Risky with the 
US policy rate, the dollar/euro exchange rate change, the euro-dollar interest rate differential, a 





the domestic demand for bank credit and its interaction with Risky.19 Our estimates are not 
significantly altered if we do not include 𝑋𝑗𝑡. 
The inclusion of firm fixed effects is key to our analysis: it rules out the possibility that our 
results could be driven by changes over time in the composition of firms raising debt. And the 
fact that we focus on changes in the debt composition rather than the debt level means that we 
abstract from changes in the aggregate demand for debt. All the firms in our analysis have a 
positive demand for debt.  
The coefficients of interest are 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). If non-EZ 
credit is countercyclical for riskier firms we should verify that  𝛽1 + 𝛽2 > 0. We then check the 
robustness of our findings to using an alternative estimator that accounts for the presence of 
many zeros in our sample. 20  
[Table 4 about here] 
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 4. Reported standard errors are 
clustered at country*year level.21 In column I, if we do not allow for a different effect of CCI 
between risky and not risky firms the effect of CCI is negative and not significant statistically or 
economically.  In column II we allow for a different effect for risky and not risky firms which we 
find to be positive as expected but not significant statistically in the full sample. It is statistically 
and economically significant if we restrict the sample to real purpose loans, column III.  This 
result may be attributable to the sharp decline in leveraged buyouts and mergers and acquisitions 





vary due to changes in demand. In other words, by focusing on real investment loans we address 
the concern that lending declined also because of a decline in the demand for restructuring loans. 
Indeed, firms scale back on expansion plans during a recession. Another issue may be that our 
results are driven by a change in the composition of loans by purpose over time. If the number of 
loans that tend to be more often extended by international syndicates increase over times then our 
estimates would be biased upward due to this compositional change. In Table A1 of the online 
Appendix we report the composition of syndicated lending by loan purpose, bank nationality and 
currency denomination. We observe that there is not much change in the composition of loans by 
purpose but, consistent with our interpretation, there is a significant shift to dollar which is bigger 
for categories with large proportions of foreign banks (with the exception of project finance). To 
further address this issue, we run a regression including loan purpose fixed effects in column IV. 
Our results are unaltered. 
In terms of magnitude the shift to non-EZ banks is significant:  an increase in CCI from the 10th 
percentile to the 90th percentile is associated with a 25 percentage point increase in the 
participation of non-EZ banks to real purpose loans. Also when we focus on US credit and 
eliminate non-US non-EZ loans from the sample, we find that US credit is countercyclical for 
both real and total loans, column V. An increase in CCI from the 10th percentile to the 90th 
percentile is associated with a 9 percentage point increase in the participation of US banks to 
syndicated loans extended to riskier borrowers. The estimate of 𝛽1 which captures the effect on 
non-risky firms instead is small and statistically insignificant, meaning that on average US banks 
increase risk when EZ banks reduce risk. This is consistent with the fact that, since US banks 





seize the opportunity to increase returns by shifting from safe to risky corporate loans, without 
consequences on their capital requirement.  Instead, when we exclude US credit from the sample 
we find that non-US non-EZ credit is acyclical (not reported). In column VI we run a regression 
restricting the sample to the firms that had a pre-crisis relationship with a weak EZ bank, 
meaning they had borrowed in the 4 years preceding the crisis from a bank that had a leverage 
ratio below 3% or that received public capital injections during the crisis.22 We find an effect that 
is statistically significant and economically high. In contrast, for firms that did not have a 
relationship with a weak EZ bank we find the effect of CCI to be insignificant (not reported). In 
other words, our findings are reasonable in that we find the effect of the credit crunch to be 
significant only for the exposed firms. 
 
3.2 The Shift to Dollar 
To see whether the credit crunch alone caused a significant shift to dollar funding, we estimate an 
equation as in (1) but with the dependent variable being the proportion of debt issued in dollar by 
a given firm in a given quarter. Since we have very few observations lying between 0 and 1 (most 
firms borrow in either currency but not both) we then focus on the probability of borrowing a 
positive dollar amount and report estimates from a linear probability model (LPM) as well as a 
graphical representation of the interaction effect of interest using a logit estimator.  Since our 
prior is that the shift to dollar is explained by the shift to non-EZ banks, for now we focus on the 





sample of real purpose loans (less affected by shifts in demand) and the sample of loans with a 
US bank participation.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The OLS results are reported in Table 5 columns I and II. We find 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 to be positive and 
statistically and economically significant for real purpose loans23 (column I) and for loans with a 
US bank participation (column II). We report separate results for the sample of loans to which US 
banks participate because we suppose that US banks have small euro deposits: if they lend more 
to European corporates, this increase in lending is more likely to be associated with a shift to 
dollar. This shift would allow keeping currency risk and the associated capital requirement low. 
In column II, an increase in CCI from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile is associated with a 
25 percent increase in the proportion of newly issued US loans denominated in dollar.  
In column III, we check whether our results are sensitive to adding loan purpose fixed effects to 
equation (1). This is again to address the concern that firms that have a relatively high demand 
for loans during the crisis may get loans that are more often arranged by international syndicates 
and dollar denominated, for some reason we ignore. The results are barely affected. In columns 
IV to VI we report estimates for the probability of borrowing in dollar. The results are robust: 
𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is confirmed to be positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for real purpose 
loans and for loans with a US bank participation. And the point estimates are larger if we exclude 
from the sample loans with only EZ bank participation (not reported).  
We run two important robustness checks to further support our interpretation of the results. First, 





dollar denominated loans. This reduces considerably our sample to the sample of firms that are 
matched to Amadeus, the database containing additional firm characteristics. Descriptive 
statistics of the additional characteristics are reported in Table A2 of the online appendix. We 
consider profitability, firm size, leverage, collateral, cash. The regression results including these 
additional characteristics are shown in Table 6. Risky stands out as the only firm characteristic 
that contributes to explain the shift to both non-EZ banks and to dollar during the crisis. In 
columns I and II we just replicate our baseline analysis in the reduced matched SDC-Amadeus 
sample for the percentage of foreign banks and the percentage of dollar borrowing. The results 
are rather stable. Then in columns III and IV we augment the baseline regression with the 
additional firm characteristics we have collected. Again the results are unchanged: our indicator 
of firm risk Risky interacted with CCI is significant while the other firm characteristics have 
insignificant statistical and/or economic effects, notably during the crisis. In columns V and VI 
we use leverage as an alternative measure of firm riskiness and find it to be as relevant as Risky 
and more relevant than other firm characteristics. We prefer using the indicator Risky because it 
is available for all firms in Dealscan, while leverage is only observed for the few firms for which 
we have balance-sheet data.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Second, we explicitly test whether it is the bank nationality or other bank characteristics that 
matter in explaining whether a bank lends more to risky firms during the crisis. For instance, it 
could be that bank nationality proxies for bank health. To this end, we collect additional bank 





sample covers 51 banks that have a significant participation in the European syndicated loan 
market. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A3 of the online appendix separately for EZ 
and non-EZ banks: non-EZ banks appear healthier than EZ banks along some but not all 
characteristics, for some measures of funding structure and asset quality EZ banks are on average 
healthier. This is true whether we consider average characteristics over the sample period or in 
2006 (pre-crisis). Hence nationality appears to be a poor proxy of bank health. 
[Table 7 about here] 
To confirm the relevance of nationality against other bank characteristics we run bank-year level 
regressions where the dependent variable is either a bank percentage of lending to risky firms or 
the proportion of its lending that is denominated in dollar. The results are shown in Table 7.  All 
time-varying bank characteristics are lagged one year. In column I we find that for the crisis 
period the non-EZ bank dummy is the only variable that is robustly and significantly 
(economically) associated with an increase in lending to risky firms. In column II we confirm that 
this effect is mainly driven by US banks. It is much weaker for UK banks and Japanese banks. In 
columns III and IV, the dependent variable is the % of a bank lending in dollar. Again, the large 
shift to dollar during the crisis is driven by nationality and not by other bank characteristics, and 
it is stronger at US banks. Bank size matters as well, but its effect is economically much smaller. 
A one standard deviation increase in log assets is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase 
in the proportion of lending denominated in dollar during the crisis. The shift to dollar is greater 
if the dependent variable is the percentage of lending in dollar to risky firms, column V. In Table 





characteristics with CCI instead of a crisis dummy. That implies using data by bank and country 
because unlike the crisis dummy CCI varies across countries as well. This does not change 
anything to our conclusions. All in all, it does not matter how we do it, our results are very stable 
and show that the only bank characteristic consistently explaining the changes we document is 
bank nationality. 
The role of bank nationality could be explained by the fact that non-European banks are more 
exposed to a drying up of wholesale funding because they cannot easily substitute interbank 
funding by deposits. Data on non-European subsidiaries show that they have a much lower access 
to euro deposits to finance their euro assets. For example, in 2006, the deposit to asset ratio was 
0.30 for non-European banks compared to 0.44 for European banks.24 We do not have data on 
branches since they do not report separate accounts from their parent bank, but there are various 
reasons why it is more difficult for foreign branches to raise local deposits.  First, non-European 
branches do not participate in the deposit insurance scheme of EZ countries.25 26  Further, 
deposits in foreign branches of US banks do not quality for US deposit insurance.27 Second, non-
European branches do not have access to the ECB liquidity facilities.28 For these important 
reasons it is plausible to expect non-European banks, chiefly US banks, to shift away from euro 
more and to a greater extent if they have entered the European market by opening branches rather 
than subsidiaries.  
To test this hypothesis, we collected the number of branches and subsidiaries located in Europe 
for each non-EZ bank in our sample (see Table A5 of the online appendix) and examine the 





confirm that the shift to dollar is indeed greater for non-EZ banks with a higher proportion of 
branches.29 All in all, these results are in line with our conjecture that the shift to dollar is 
significantly channeled through a shift to banks that are both non-EZ and non-European. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
3.3 Transmission Channels 
We further develop the analysis of the channels through which dollar borrowing rises. First, we 
test the hypothesis that the domestic credit crunch was associated with a higher increase in 
spreads paid by riskier firms borrowing from EZ banks only compared to firms borrowing from 
non-EZ banks. Hence, the shift to non-EZ banks is significant also at the intensive margin. 
Second, we show that the rise in dollar borrowing during the credit crunch is significant in the 
full sample once we account for the amplifying effect of the drying up of liquidity in the euro 
interbank market. Third, we assess the extent to which the effect of the credit crunch on the 
composition of risky corporate debt is driven by good firms shifting from loans to bonds.  
 
3.3.1 Borrowing costs 
So far we have implicitly assumed that risky firms switch to foreign loans because domestic 
loans are becoming more expensive and not because foreign loans are becoming cheaper due to 





become more attractive independently of the deterioration of the EZ supply of credit. For 
example, non-EZ loans may become more attractive if the cost of funding of non-EZ banks falls 
relative to the cost of funding of EZ banks due to looser monetary policy abroad. We have 
already addressed this issue somewhat by controlling for the interaction of Risky with the US 
monetary policy rate. 
To check this further, let 𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑅  and 𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑁𝑅 be the foreign cost of credit for risky and non-risky firms. 






that is, whether the difference in the cost of foreign credit between risky and safe borrowers 
varies negatively with CCI, indicating a positive correlation of CCI with heightened search for 
yield among foreign lenders. We want also to test whether, for the domestic banks, the difference 
in the cost of credit between risky and safe borrowers varies positively with CCI. This would 
indicate a drying up of credit for risky borrowers that is significant at the intensive margin and 
more so when firms are only reliant on domestic banks. For this we estimate equation (1) with the 
all-in-drawn spread to benchmark as dependent variable for non-EZ loans and EZ loans 
separately. We extend the list of control variables to include loan characteristics: issue size, 
currency denomination, maturity, an issue type dummy and a loan purpose dummy. The other 
control variables are as previously defined. Here too the inclusion of firm fixed effects is 






The results are reported in Table 9. In column I for non-EZ loans the correlation between 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖𝑡 and the cost of debt is nil, while in column II it is positive and statistically 
significant for EZ loans as one would expect. We can therefore more firmly confirm that riskier 
borrowers shift to non-EZ banks because they are more financially constrained at home and not 
because foreign credit becomes more attractive.  
[Table 9 about here] 
In sum, we find our story consistent with the data: non-EZ banks somewhat contribute to absorb 
the shock for those firms that suffer most from the reduction in the EZ credit supply.  
 
3.3.2 Funding costs 
To analyze the role of funding costs, we consider the following specification which we run on the 
sample of quarters when EZ banks tighten credit standards (CCI > 0): 
  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡2 = 𝑐2 + 𝜃𝑖2 + 𝛿1𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                 (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡2  is a dummy for borrowing in dollar. 𝑅𝑃𝑡 is either the euro interbank risk premium, or 
the dollar interbank risk premium, or the Euro basis. The other variables are defined as in 
equation (1). Again our estimates are not significantly altered if we do not include 𝑋𝑗𝑡.  
In Table 10 we report estimates of 𝛿1.30 As predicted by our model, we find that an increase in 
the Euribor-ois spread (ERP) amplifies the shift to dollar during the crisis. A 100 basis point 





borrows in dollar compared with a non-risky firm, column I. In column II, an increase in the 
dollar interbank risk premium has no effect.  This can be explained by the fact that US banks 
have abundant dollar deposits which they can use to substitute for a fall in dollar wholesale 
funding.  In column III we find that an increase in the euro basis of 100 basis points is associated 
with a 19 percentage points higher shift to dollar for riskier firms. The results are stable if we 
control for loan purpose fixed effects, in column IV.  
[Table 10 about here] 
So far we have conjectured that the underlying mechanism through which ERP leads to a shift to 
foreign currency is that banks facing increased pressure in euro funding reduce their supply of 
euro credit relative to dollar credit. To check this supply effect more directly we estimate the 
pass-through of ERP on lending rates of euro denominated loans using equation (2). The 
dependent variable now is the all-in-drawn spread to benchmark. The results are reported in 
Table 11.  
[Table 11 about here] 
In column I, we see that an increase in ERP causes an increase in the lending rate to risky firms 
for all banks. Now if we separate EZ loans only (column II) and loans with a non-EZ bank 
participation (column III), we find the pass-through of the funding cost to the lending rate to be 
significant for both sub-sample but slightly bigger for the sample of non-EZ loans. 
 





Ivashina and Becker (2014) have shown that during periods of tight lending standards, US 
investment grade corporates shift from bank credit to the bond market. They conclude from this 
that the aggregate loan-to-bond substitution can be interpreted as alternative measure of 
contraction in credit supply.  
In our context, investment-grade firms shifting from loans to bonds is another possible channel 
through which the credit crunch might affect the composition of risky corporate debt.31  To assess 
the importance of this channel in explaining the rise in dollar borrowing we first replicated the 
analysis of Ivashina and Becker and did find a significant relationship between CCI and the 
choice of bonds versus loans. We then replicated Tables 4 and 5 using instead of CCI the fraction 
of firms which used bond finance among those firms that tap only one type of financing in each 
quarter, but found estimates that were insignificant. In sum, in this context, the aggregate loan-to-
bond substitution is significant but does not explain why risky corporates access non-EZ banks 
more and why they borrow more in dollar during the credit crunch.  
 
3.4 Additional Robustness Checks 
Due to the presence of many zeros in our sample we then run a fractional logit model developed 
by Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008) for proportion data. This model captures non-linear 
relationships, especially when the outcome variable is near 0 or 1.  This non-linear model is 
however not our preferred model for two reasons: first it does not accommodate our large number 
of fixed effects and second, interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models is far from 





interaction effects (Ai and Norton (2003)).32 Green (2010) explains how to use simple graphical 
devices to depict interaction effects in non-linear models.  Following his approach, Figure 5 
depicts the interaction effect of CCI and Risky in the fractional logit model: the relationship 
between the predicted fraction of non-EZ lenders and CCI, separately for risky and not risky 
firms.  The distance between the two curves gives the interaction effect between CCI and Risky. 
At high levels of CCI up to 45% of the risky firms’ borrowing is predicted to be from non-EZ 
banks, against less than 12% for not risky firms.  This distance between the two curves increases 
as CCI increases and it is economically and statistically significant as the two confidence 
intervals do not overlap hence confirming our findings so far using a linear model.33 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Figure 6 shows the interaction effect of CCI with risky from a logit model where the dependent 
variable is a dummy for dollar borrowing. We see that the predicted probability of dollar 
borrowing is significantly higher for the risky firms and more so at higher levels of CCI 
confirming OLS estimates. The marginal effects for the non-interacted terms are not significant 
and are reported in the online Appendix Table A9. We also replicated Tables 4 and 5 using a 
crisis dummy instead of CCI and the results were broadly confirmed.34 Note that when both the 
dependent and the explanatory variables are dummy variables, a linear and non-linear model 
deliver the same results.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
Figure 7 depicts the effect of the interaction between ERP and the dummy for risky firms on the 





risky and not risky increases and is statistically and economically significant hence confirming 
the OLS estimates.  
[Figure 7 about here] 
We ran several additional unreported robustness checks. First, we ran weighted least squares 
based on loan size and obtained similar results with often larger point estimates. This means that 
our results are not driven by a higher number of small value loans but hold also for large and very 
large loans.  
Second, we re-estimated all equations controlling for trade credit and its interaction with Risky 
measured at country and sector level. Trade credit and bank credit are linked. A reduction in 
domestic bank credit might cause an increase in trade credit as firms delay payments to providers. 
In that case trade credit is a substitute to bank credit. On the other hand, during a severe credit 
crunch, good firms experiencing a decline in credit could cut trade credit to bad firms. It is 
therefore unclear a priori in what direction controlling for trade credit will affect our estimates. 
We used two alternative data sources, the BACH database35 and Amadeus Bureau van Dijk,36 
which report accounts payable scaled by total sales as the measure of trade credit. Although we 
lose more than a fourth of our sample due to data being unavailable for some countries and/or 
some sectors, our results are barely altered.  
We also analyzed the shift from bank to bond finance and found that for risky firms bond 
finance37 is procyclical while for investment grade firms it is countercyclical. Investment grade 
firms could issue euro bonds as substitutes for euro loans, while risky firms could only tap on 





A third robustness exercise we ran is to modify our definition of domestic banks to include only 
banks headquartered in the same country as the borrower. This means that we reconsider the 
assumption that the EZ credit market is fully integrated. If we do that we continue to find that 
extra-EZ credit is countercyclical but that credit from non-domestic EZ banks is procyclical and 
that non-domestic EZ credit does not shift significantly toward dollar, which confirms that our 
original definition of a domestic bank is more pertinent.   
Fourth, our results are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of the stance of EZ and US 
monetary policy. The stance of monetary policy at home can differ across EZ countries due to 
differences in inflation rates and this might cause banks to take more risk in some EZ countries 
than in others. Controlling for the real interest rate therefore allows isolating the effect of 
variations in domestic banks’ credit policy solely due to shocks to their capital position. In 
addition, we included the US long term rate interacted with Risky to account for the main channel 
through which US unconventional monetary policies implemented since late 2008 could augment 
risk taking by US banks. The fact that we found that changes in the stance of US monetary policy 
do not explain the increase in risk taking by US banks supports our conjecture that regulatory 
capital arbitrage played its role.  
All in all, we find that a twin crisis in the credit market and in funding markets explains the 
dramatic shift from euro credit to dollar credit observed for low-credit-quality EZ borrowers in 
2007-2009. This shift to dollar is not channeled through a decline in trade credit or caused by the 






4. REAL EFFECT OF NON-EUROZONE BANKING DURING THE 
CREDIT CRUNCH 
We test the real benefit of using a foreign bank relationship during the credit crunch. We follow 
in spirit Chodorow-Reich (2013) and estimate the effect of being exposed to a weak bank before 
the crisis on the change in employment between 2008 (peak) and 2010 (trough). We then extend 
his analysis by examining the mitigating effect of foreign banking measured by the percentage of 
non-EZ banks in the last pre-crisis loan syndicate. One issue is the possibility that firms that can 
build a relationship with a foreign bank perform better, grow faster, be less exposed to the 
domestic cycle. In this case, our estimate of the effect of foreign banking on employment will be 
biased upward. We can also imagine that weaker firms are more pressured to multiply banking 
relationships and borrow from abroad. It is therefore unclear in what direction our estimates will 
be biased.  
To address the possible endogeneity of foreign banking, we apply an instrumental variables 
approach using as instruments the propensity of the last pre-crisis loan arranger(s) to co-syndicate 
with non-EZ banks. We report first-stage F-statistics and over-identification test statistics that 
validate our instruments. We also report a standard test of weak instrumental variables which 
supports the hypothesis that the instruments we use are strong predictors of foreign banking.  
The baseline regression for the change in employment E reads:  





which we estimate separately for risky and non-risky firms.  𝛿𝑗  and 𝜃𝑠 are country and industry 
fixed effects. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of variables which controls for credit demand (cash holdings before 
the credit crunch, whether the last pre-crisis debt issued was a credit line rather than a term loan 
or a bond, and whether the firm has a debt maturing during the credit crunch), access to the bond 
market, and other relevant firm characteristics (total assets and age).  
To estimate regressions (3) we hand-matched the Dealscan with the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus 
data which contains the number of employees by firm and firms’ balance sheet data. We could 
exactly match 691 firms and after eliminating firms that reported zero total assets in 2007, we 
were left with a sample of 450 firms. We cover 12 EZ countries and 23 sectors. Of these 450 
firms 25% issue risky debt, and 288 firms have a relationship with a non-EZ bank. The growth 




2008  is on average -2.5%, with large variations, the 10
th percentile is -
32%, after winsorizing the data at the 1% and 99% level.  
Before we present the results from estimating equation (3), we report that our measure of 
exposure to the credit crunch 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is relevant. 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 captures 
the exposure of firm i to the credit crunch: it is the interaction between the firm credit quality 
(risky or not risky) in 2007 and a dummy for having a pre-crisis relationship with a weak bank 
based on the last pre-crisis syndicate.  
We estimate the effect of  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖 on a dummy that indicates whether a firm borrowed 
during the Q3-2007/Q4-2009 credit crunch (ACCESS) and the difference in the average rate it 





covers firms that borrowed before the credit crunch going back to 2003. The results are reported 
in Table 12 including a full range of pre-crisis loans characteristics, fixed effects for the year of 
the last pre-crisis loan, borrower industry and country fixed effects, and controls for the demand 
for credit (bond market access and a dummy for whether a debt matures during the crisis). What 
we find is that higher exposure to the credit crunch is associated with a 10.6 percent lower 
probability of obtaining a loan during the crisis.  
[Table 12 about here] 
The decline in credit is also significant at the intensive margin with more exposed firms paying 
on average a spread 238 basis points higher that pre-crisis (column II). In column III conditional 
on obtaining a loan, non-EZ banks participation is 10 percent higher when EZ bank relationships 
are weak.   
[Table 13 about here] 
We now turn to the results of estimating equation (3), reported in Table 13. In column I the credit 
crunch captured by  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 affects employment growth negatively. Then we run 
separate regressions for risky and non-risky firms to estimate the mitigating effect of having a 
non-EZ bank relationship which we capture with the interaction term 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 ∗
% 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘. First, in columns II and III we show that relying more on non-EZ banks does 
not make a difference on average. It makes a difference only for risky firms exposed to weak EZ 
banks. This is shown in column IV: for risky firms exposed to a weak EZ bank, having a non-EZ 





EZ banks have no role as these firms are not exposed to the credit crunch (column V). The 2SLS 
(columns VI and VII) estimates are larger. We report a first-stage F-statistic above 10 and the 
Hansen J-statistic cannot reject exogeneity of our instruments.  
Fully non-EZ banked exposed firms do not reduce employment while exposed firms fully reliant 
on EZ banks reduce employment by up to 33 %. This effect encompasses not only the effect of 
obtaining a loan but also the effect of a decline in the amount of credit, the effect of an increase in 
the spread, shorter maturities, as well as the effect of uncertainty of future credit availability 
given labor adjustment costs. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The increase in dollar borrowing by non-investment grade EZ firms in the recent financial crisis 
is a puzzling phenomenon. In this paper, we propose an explanation that is consistent with the 
empirical analysis. The existing literature emphasizes a set of factors determining the currency 
denomination of debt, mainly the borrower’s export intensity or foreign currency income and the 
interest rate differential between domestic and foreign currency loans. In this paper we have 
shown that during a liquidity crisis other factors also matter: an increase in the relative cost of 
funding in euro, which reduces the supply of credit by domestic lenders and curbs the willingness 
of foreign lenders to bear currency risk, causes a shift to foreign currency credit. This is true 
provided that foreign credit is countercyclical. We show that this was the case in Europe during 





The way bank capital is regulated appears to play an important role in the process. The fact that 
US banks operated under Basel I meant that they had an incentive to shift to riskier corporate 
loans when EZ banks retrenched. Our analysis is therefore consistent with the view that the move 
from Basel I to Basel II with risk-sensitive capital requirements has contributed to amplify the 
credit cycle. Basel III goes some way towards addressing the problem through the introduction of 
mandatory buffers, a capital preservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer, that are built-up in 
good times and can be released in bad times to avoid a credit crunch.  
Since 2009 the rise in offshore dollar credit has spread to emerging markets. This expansion, 
however, has not been fueled by a domestic credit crunch, but rather by low US interest rates. 
Contrary to the EZ experience in 2007-2009, this increase in foreign currency credit has been 
procyclical and may threaten financial stability as it stimulates credit booms. The financial 
systems in these countries are then vulnerable to sudden withdrawals, exchange rate risk, and 
sudden rises of foreign interest rates.  
 
APPENDIX: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The objective of this appendix is to provide a framework to structure the empirical analysis. To 
explain the increase in foreign currency borrowing, we propose an explanation in two steps. In 
the first step, we consider the switch by riskier firms from EZ to foreign, mainly US, banks. In 
the second step, more export-oriented firms switch from Home to Foreign currency borrowing 






A.1 Shift to More Risky Loans by Foreign Banks 
Consider a simple framework where Home firms can borrow from Home and Foreign banks. 
Firms differ in their exposure to exchange rate risk and in their overall credit riskiness for 
lenders. For simplicity assume that there are two levels of credit riskiness, Risky and Not Risky, 
and that credit risk is not correlated to exchange rate risk. The focus is on Risky firms as they are 
dependent on bank loans, while Not Risky firms can find alternative sources of financing. 
Moreover, Risky firms have more impact on the riskiness of banks portfolios and are more likely 
to be affected by shocks to banks’ capital or changes in capital regulation.38 Risky firms receive a 
proportion of 𝑁𝑡 Home bank loans and 𝑁𝑡∗ = 1 − 𝑁𝑡 Foreign bank loans.  
We assume that a negative shock to capital has a distinct impact for Home and Foreign banks 
because of a different regulatory environment. Home banks are more risk averse as they are 
under Basel II, while Foreign banks are under Basel I.39 Home banks reduce their risk-weighted 
assets and thus reduce lending to Risky firms. This is not the case for Foreign banks, so they can 
substitute Home banks in lending to Risky firms.40 In other words, a negative capital shocks leads 
to a decline in 𝑁𝑡, and an increase in 𝑁𝑡∗. This can be summarized in the following hypothesis to 
be tested:  
HYPOTHESIS 1. In the 2007-2009 credit crunch, the most risky firms switched from 
Eurozone to Foreign banks, especially US banks.  
 
A.2 Shift to Foreign Currency Loans 
Bank loans can be either in euros, the Home currency, or in dollars, the Foreign currency. The 
spot exchange rate in euro per dollar at time t is 𝑆𝑡. Firms decide the currency of their loan based 
on risk and on the expected borrowing cost. The interest rate charged by banks to firms in euro is 
𝑖𝑡𝐸 and the one in dollars is 𝑖𝑡𝐷. Changes in 𝑖𝑡𝐸 and 𝑖𝑡𝐷 are directly affected by money market rates, 
where banks get their marginal funding. We assume that Home (Foreign) banks have an 





while Foreign banks lend both in euros and dollars. The proportion of loans in dollars is denoted 
by 𝐷𝑡. Foreign banks thus lend 𝐷𝑡 in dollars and 1 − 𝑁𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡 in euros. 
Firms can also borrow in dollars and hedge through the forward or swap market, using the 
forward rate 𝐹𝑡. When Covered Interest rate Parity (CIP) does not hold, hedged dollar borrowing 
will differ from euro borrowing. We define the deviation from CIP expressed in dollar, or the 
euro basis, as ∆𝑡= (𝑆𝑡/𝐹𝑡)(1 + 𝑖𝑡𝐸) − (1 + 𝑖𝑡𝐷). Overall, we can denote the proportion of loans in 
dollars to Risky firms as 𝐷 =  𝐷(𝑖𝐸 , 𝑖𝐷 ,∆), where 𝐷 increases with 𝑖𝐸 and ∆ and decreases with 
𝑖𝐷.  We present below a simple model deriving 𝐷(𝑖𝐸 , 𝑖𝐷 ,∆) and show that the increase in dollar 
borrowing comes from more export-oriented firms. This leads to the following testable 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. When host country interbank markets or the FX swap market dry up, 
more export-oriented risky firms increasingly borrow in dollars.  
 
A.3 Modeling Foreign Currency Borrowing 
Let us abstract from time subscripts and assume that the current exchange rate is equal to one. 
We denote by 𝑆 the next period exchange rate. We also assume that price levels are equal to one 
in each currency and that y is the total output level identical to all firms. There is a continuum of 
firms indexed by i. A proportion λi of output is sold in euros and 1-λi in dollars. Firms with low λi 
will thus be considered as export-oriented firms. We assume that λi is uniformly distributed so 
that 𝜆𝑖 ∈ [0,1]. The income of firm i is 
𝑦𝑖 = (𝜆𝑖 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑆)𝑦 
where 𝑆 is the only random variable and is assumed to be normally distributed 𝑁(1,𝜎2). We also 
assume that y = 1. 
Home firms need to borrow for production. Due to transactions costs, firms have only one loan 





expected utility. We assume that firms derive utility from their profits, U(Πi) and that the utility 
function is exponential, so that they have mean-variance preferences. We denote by 𝛱𝑖𝐸, 𝛱𝑖𝐷, and 
𝛱𝑖𝐷𝐻 the profits with borrowing in euros, in unhedged dollars and in hedged dollars. These are: 
𝛱𝑖𝐸 = 𝑦𝑖 − (1 + 𝑖𝐸) 
𝛱𝑖𝐷 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑆(1 + 𝑖𝐷) 
𝛱𝑖𝐷𝐻 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑆(1 + 𝑖𝐷) − (𝐹 − 𝑆)(1 + 𝑖𝐷) = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝐹(1 + 𝑖𝐷) 
where the last term in 𝛱𝑖𝐷𝐻 is the forward contract (assuming full hedging). When CIP holds and 
abstracting from transactions costs, 𝛱𝑖𝐸 = 𝛱𝑖𝐷𝐻 (as 𝐹(1 + 𝑖𝐷) = 1 + 𝑖𝐸).  
Firms prefer borrowing in dollars if this gives a higher expected utility than borrowing in euros, 








which is equivalent to: 
𝑖𝐸 − 𝑖𝐷 +
𝛾
2
[2(1 − 𝜆𝑖) − (1 + 𝑖𝐷)](1 + 𝑖𝐷)𝜎2 > 0 
This implies that the more export-oriented firms with 𝜆𝑖 <  𝜆∗ prefer borrowing in dollars, where 








Since 𝜆𝑖 is distributed uniformly over [0,1], 𝜆∗ also represents the aggregate demand for dollar 
borrowing. The first term in 𝜆∗ is the level below which borrowing in dollars reduces risk: only 
highly export-oriented firms find it optimal to borrow in dollars. The second term is simply 
determined by the differential cost of borrowing. If 𝑖𝐸 > 𝑖𝐷, more firms prefer borrowing in 





If 𝑖𝐸 increases, the more export oriented firms that borrow in euros (𝜆𝑖  higher but close to 𝜆∗) will 
switch to borrow in dollars. 
Moreover if CIP does not hold so that ∆ > 0, firms will start switching from euro to dollar 
borrowing (as 𝛱𝑖𝐸 < 𝛱𝑖𝐷𝐻). The extent of this switch will depend on transaction costs, that we do 
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1 This increase cannot be attributed to a valuation effect: the euro appreciated against the dollar by about 20% during 
the period when the increase was strongest, i.e., Q2-2007 and Q3-2008.  
2 Throughout the paper we use the terms leveraged, non-investment grade, low-credit quality, and risky 
interchangeably. Non-investment grade firms in our sample have an average leverage ratio (or a ratio of long-term 
debt over total debt) of 19.5% against 5.7% for investment grade firms.  
3 This indicator is the net percentage of domestic banks surveyed by the European Central Bank (ECB) that report 
tightening in credit standards to large firms in the past 3 months. 
4 While the US officially adopted Basel II in 2007, the date of expected compliance was delayed to 2012. See Daryl 
Getter, US implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework, Congressional Research Report 7-5700, 
April 9 2014.  On June 7, 2012, the Federal Banking Regulators announced the final rule for implementation of 
Basel II. First approvals for the use of Basel II capital rules were issued in February 2014. 
5 Relatedly, Duchin and Sosyura (2014) show that after receiving government support, US banks rebalance toward 
riskier assets and that this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and therefore remains undetected by 
regulatory capital ratios.    
6 We measure exposure to a weak domestic bank by a dummy indicating whether the last pre-crisis syndicate 
included the participation of a domestic bank that received public capital support, was forced into merger, or filed for 





                                                          
7 A related literature examines the role of banks with foreign ownership (see Claessens and Van Horen (2013) for a 
survey). After the financial crisis, foreign-owned banks reduced their lending more than domestically-owned banks. 
However, this decline was on average smaller than the decline in cross-border lending (see Claessens, 2017). 
8 For theoretical papers, see Aghion et al. (2004), Burnside et al. (2004), Jeanne (2005), or Schneider and Tornell 
(2004).  
9 Some of the recent literature focuses on the later period of the sovereign debt crisis, e.g., Acharya et al. (2018) or 
Popov and Van Horen (2015). 
10 Using IMF and BIS data for 2009, we find that the ratio of total outstanding syndicated credit over total bank 
claims on the EZ domestic non-financial private sector plus outstanding cross-border credit inflows is 32.6%. Using 
ECB data instead, we find that the ratio of total outstanding syndicated credit over the stock of loans to non-financial 
firms is 32.2%.  
11 “Risky” indicates whether a loan is leveraged or high-yield, that is, made to relatively risky borrowers. Loan 
Pricing Corporation defines a leveraged loan as a syndicated loan that is rated BB+ or lower or an unrated loan with 
an interest-rate spread larger than 150 basis points. 
12 Within a quarter, firms issue on average 2.6 loans mostly from the same syndicate and borrow on average from 4.6 
banks. We do not however observe the contribution of each bank.  
13 Following the decision of BNP Paribas to suspend withdrawals from some of its hedged funds invested in US 
subprime mortgage backed securities due to the inability to mark these assets to markets. 
14 Although the method of calculation of this index is not harmonized across countries, that does not affect our 
analysis because our regressions include firms fixed effects. Three countries for which the index is not available, 
Greece, Finland, and Belgium, are excluded from the sample. From the same survey we also collected a measure of 
credit demand, the net percentage of banks reporting an increase in the demand for credit by large firms, for each EZ 
country.   
15 According to Coffrey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009) arbitrageurs had limited capacity to shrink the basis due to the 
inability to raise capital quickly and/or heightened counterparty risk.  
16 Interest rates and exchange rates are downloaded from Reuters.   
17 Instead, before 2008, banks mention competition from foreign banks as a reason for loosening credit standards 
which would bias our estimates downward.  
18 All our results are also robust to the inclusion of country*year fixed effects.  
19 The net percentage of US (European) banks reporting an increase in the demand for credit. These measures are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Board and the ECB websites, respectively.  
20 In the online Appendix Table A10 we also specify a linear probability model for the probability of borrowing from 
a foreign bank and use a dummy for the crisis period to measure credit tightening instead of CCI. When both the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variable are dummies, linear and non-linear models deliver similar results 
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Our conclusions continue to hold with this alternative specification.  
21 We have followed Cameron and Miller (2013) in deciding at what level to cluster the standard errors. They 
recommend using “a conservative approach to avoid bias and use bigger and more aggregate clusters when possible, 
up to and including the point at which there is concern about having too few clusters”. We tried also clustering by 
country only and the results are unchanged. 
22 The data come from Merrouche and Mariathasan (2012). 
23 The test p-value, not reported in the table, is 0.017. 
24 These numbers are computed from Bankscope, where the origin of a bank is taken from Claessens and Van Horen 
(2014). 
25 For a detailed review of the difference in deposit insurance treatment between deposits in non-European and 
European banks see Azevedo and Bonfim, “Deposits Insurance and Cross-Border Banks”, ifo DICE Report I/ 2019 
Spring Volume 17. 
26 The term non-European here is important because UK banks for example are non-EZ but European, their branches 
do have the obligation to participate in the deposit insurance scheme of the host country. Interestingly, in our results 
we find that among non-EZ banks, the shift away from euro lending is not significant for UK banks, which are non-





                                                                                                                                                                                            
27 See Reuters 10.09.2013 “U.S. FDIC says foreign deposits not eligible for deposit insurance”. 
28 This is because one criterion for access is to be subject to the supervision of a European authority. See Guideline 
(EU) 2015/510 of the ECB of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy 
framework (ECB/2014/60), OJ L 91, 2.4.2015, p. 3, with Amending Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2015/27), OJ L 
282, 28.10.2015, p. 3. 
29 Bräuning and Ivashina (2017) also use the proportion of branches as an indicator of the ease of domestic deposits 
funding. 
30 If we estimate equation (2) on the full sample or the quarters when CCI ≤ 0 all estimates are statistically 
insignificant. In line with our predictions disruptions in funding market cause a shift to dollar only in quarters when 
domestic banks restrict credit.  
31 For sake of brevity we just summarize our findings here which we report in the online Appendix Tables A6 to A8. 
32 Indeed, the marginal effect of a change in both interacted variables is not equal to the marginal effect of the 
interacted term,  
33 For sake of brevity we report the marginal effects for the non-interacted terms in the online Appendix in Table A9 
as they were not significant statistically and economically. 
34 See online Appendix Tables A10 and A11.  
35 Available at https://www.bach.banque-france.fr/ 
36 Although these data are available at firm level we used country-sector averages because of the very imperfect 
matching between SDC platinum and Amadeus.  
37 The data source for bond issuance is SDC platinum. We included only non-convertible bonds and excluded 
mortgage backed-securities, asset-backed securities, and preference shares which are listed as bonds. 
38 There are various mechanisms that can lead to a larger impact on more risky firms. E.g., Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997), where a credit crunch removes all financing for the riskier firms. But if the credit crunch is for Home banks 
only, the riskier firms can turn to Foreign banks. 
39 The procyclical effect of Basel II capital standards has been widely discussed, both in theoretical models and in 
empirical analyses. E.g., see Behn et al. (2016), Kayshap and Stein (2004) or Repullo and Suarez (2012).  
40 Besides a simple substitution effect, there may have been additional factors pushing US banks towards more risky 
portfolios (e.g., low interest rates or government support). See Aramonte et al. (forthcoming), Duch and Sosyura 
(2014), or Landier et al. (2015). 





                                                                                                                                                                                            
   
Figure 1. Syndicated loan issuance denominated in US dollar 
 
The sample includes all non-financial Eurozone borrowers.  













Figure 2. Percentage of syndicated loan issuance denominated in US dollars by borrower 
risk type 
 
Risky borrowers are rated below investment grade. The sample includes all non-financial Eurozone 
borrowers.  

























Figure 4. Deviation from covered interest parity measured by the Euro basis (basis points).  
The Euro basis is constructed using 3 month daily euribor-OIS spread, 3 month daily dollar libor-OIS 





Figure 5. Relationship between credit standards and the predicted fraction of non-
Eurozone lenders from a fractional logit model for risky and not risky firms 
 
 
Note: The credit contraction index is the net % of banks that report tightening of credit standards in the past 
quarter from the ECB lending survey. Risky firms are firms rated below investment grade or not rated. The 
fractional logit model from which the predicted fraction of non-Eurozone lenders in a syndicate is derived 













Figure 6. Relationship between credit standards and the predicted probability of dollar 
borrowing from a logit model for risky and not risky firms 
 
 
Note: The credit contraction index is the net % of banks that report tightening of credit standards in the past 
quarter from the ECB lending survey. Risky firms are firms rated below investment grade or not rated. The 
logit model from which the predicted probability of dollar borrowing is derived includes the same set of 














Figure 7. Relationship between the euro risk premium and the predicted probability of 




Note: Risky firms are firms rated below investment grade or not rated. The logit model from which the 
predicted probability of dollar borrowing is derived includes the same set of control variables as in equation 












Table 1. Sample composition by country  
 
This table reports the composition of our SDC Platinum sample by country. The sample period is 2004-Q1 to 2009-
Q4. Loans include both credit lines and term loans. In column I we report the number of firms with positive 
syndicated loan issuance by country over the sample period; in column II the number of issuers that have borrowed 
at least once from a non-Eurozone bank; and in column III   the number of issuers that have borrowed at least once 
in US dollar. In columns IV-VI we report the number of firms that have borrowed at least twice and are therefore 


























  I II III IV V VI 
Austria  27 15 2 9 8 1 
Belgium 90 44 10 23 20 3 
Finland 70 66 2 25 23 1 
France 856 337 59 215 154 23 
Germany  622 270 56 150 104 14 
Greece 77 45 21 17 12 8 
Ireland 72 39 18 15 9 3 
Italy 528 120 24 100 49 10 
Luxembourg 44 35 11 8 7 2 
Netherlands 296 190 54 84 69 26 
Portugal 160 29 11 14 3 2 
Spain 752 321 39 135 98 12 
Total  3594 1511 307 795 556 105 









Table 2. Distribution of Eurozone syndicated loan activity by lender nationality 
This table reports market shares by lender nationality before and during the credit crunch based 
on amounts pro-rated by the number of participating banks. In order to abstract from changes in 
the population of firms tapping the market at different times, these shares are calculated on the 
sample of firms that have a positive demand for credit in both periods. We report total market 
shares, and separately market shares for the leveraged segment and the investment grade segment 










     
  
% Total 
lending % Risky 
% Not  
Risky % USD 
 
US banks 17% 24% 16% 11% 
 
UK banks 9% 8% 9% 10% 
 
Japenese banks  3% 1% 3% 8% 
 
Other banks  12% 15% 12% 8% 
 
All non-Eurozone banks 41% 49% 40% 10% 
 
Eurozone banks 59% 51% 60% 7% 
      
      
      Q3-
2007/Q4-
2009 
     
  
% Total 
lending % Risky 
% Not 
Risky % USD 
 
US banks 14% 28% 9% 42% 
 
UK banks 9% 9% 9% 20% 
 
Japenese banks  4% 1% 5% 26% 
 
Other banks  14% 15% 14% 25% 
 
All non-Eurozone banks 41% 54% 38% 30% 
 




Table 3. Largest non-Eurozone banks participants in the Eurozone syndicated loans market 
This table reports the percentage of total lending by each listed bank to risky (non-investment grade) 
Eurozone borrowers, and the percentage of total lending denominated in US dollars. The numbers 
correspond to pro-rated figures.    
 
    Q1-2004/Q2-2007 Q3-2007/Q4-2009 
     Risky Dollar Risky Dollar 
      UK and Swiss banks 
     
      Barclays 
 
25% 11% 22% 20% 
Lloyds 
 
46% 9% 31% 22% 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
 
40% 11% 35% 24% 
Crédit Suisse  
 
45% 9% 47% 41% 
      US banks 
     
      BOA-Merrill Lynch 
 
35% 19% 38% 36% 
Citibank 
 
20% 21% 32% 31% 
Goldman Sachs 
 
42% 9% 59% 37% 
JP-Morgan 
 
44% 25% 54% 44% 
Morgan-Stanley 
 
38% 12% 48% 30% 
      Japanese banks 
     
      Mitsubishi-UFJ 
 
7% 10% 6% 16% 
Namura-INC 
 
70% 8% 71% 36% 
Sumitomo 
 
18% 7% 10% 16% 




Table 4. The domestic credit crunch and the shift to non-Eurozone banks   
The dependent variable is the proportion of non-Eurozone lead banks (arrangers) in the syndicate. Risky indicates whether a firm is rated non-investment 
grade. CCI is the net percentage of Eurozone banks that tightened lending standards to large firms in the previous 3 months. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country*year. All columns include firm fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, and the 
Eurozone-US policy rate differential interacted Risky, the euro-dollar exchange rate change interacted with Risky, the Fed target rate interacted with Risky, 
the borrower home country credit demand index and its interaction with Risky, and the US credit demand index and its interaction with Risky. The data are 




















 I II III IV V VI 










 Weak bank 
Risky -1.553 -2.115 -7.679 -10.531 -0.201 0.551 
 (2.984) (2.905) (6.026) (6.081)* (3.526) (6.783) 
CCI -0.039 -0.069 -0.027 0.002 0.002 -0.295 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.112) (0.105) (0.054) (0.111)** 
CCI*Risky  0.106 0.523 0.495 0.184 0.373 
  (0.094) (0.151)*** (0.145)*** (0.086)** (0.149)** 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.04 





Table 5. The domestic credit crunch and the shift to US dollar  
 
The sample period is Q1-2004 to Q4-2009 and the variables are as defined in Table 4. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
country*year.  All columns include firm fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, and the Eurozone-US policy rate differential interacted Risky, the euro-
dollar exchange rate change interacted with Risky, the Fed target interacted with Risky, the borrower home country credit demand index and its interaction 

















* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Real purpose 
loans 
With US bank participation Real 
purpose 
loans 
With US bank participation 
Dependent 
variable 
% dollar borrowing Dummy for dollar borrowing 
Risky -4.767 1.939 0.870 0.016 0.022 0.006 
 (3.883) (4.879) (5.356) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) 
CCI 0.037 -0.142 -0.142 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.112) (0.189) (0.173) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CCI*Risky 0.206 0.480 0.427 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.142) (0.198)** (0.190)** (0.002) (0.002)* (0.002)** 
       
Loan 
purpose FE 
no no   yes         no          no          yes 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.15 




Table 6. The shift to non-Eurozone banks: additional firm characteristics  
This tables reports results with additional firms’ characteristics for a sample of firms that could be 
matched with Amadeus. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A2 of the online Appendix. Collateral 
is tangible assets over total assets, leverage is long term debt over total assets. All other variables are as 


























Risky -10.531 -6.191 -26.259 -14.727   
 (6.081)* (3.782) (7.393)*** (9.469)   
CCI 0.002 0.051 0.107 0.295   
 (0.105) (0.110) (0.326) (0.884)   
CCI*Risky 0.495 0.192 0.454 0.602   
 (0.145)*** (0.143) (0.264)* (0.335)*   
Leverage     -6.000 -3.776 
     (12.082) (8.456) 
CCI*Leverage     -0.127 0.821 
     (0.701) (0.424)* 
Log assets   -3.986 -1.123 -2.326 -0.473 
   (1.574)** (2.123) (1.487) (2.547) 
CCI*Log assets   -0.063 -0.070 -0.039 0.044 
   (0.041) (0.085) (0.048) (0.055) 
ROA   -0.052 0.299 -0.059 0.330 
   (0.069) (0.191) (0.094) (0.200) 
CCI*ROA   -0.001 -0.031 0.000 -0.024 
   (0.004) (0.010)*** (0.003) (0.011)** 
Log  cash   1.178 0.602 1.119 1.640 
   (0.730) (1.526) (0.700) (1.285) 
CCI*Log cash   0.083 0.073 0.055 -0.024 
   (0.038)** (0.065) (0.045) (0.033) 
Collateral   7.964 -21.724 6.342 -28.949 
   (7.670) (16.473) (8.084) (21.261) 
CCI*collateral   -0.425 -0.259 -0.348 -0.868 
   (0.250)* (0.341) (0.324) (0.316)*** 
CCI*Listed   -0.387 0.084 -0.387 -0.127 
   (0.162)** (0.172) (0.192)** (0.150) 
       
R2 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.21 0.34 
N 873 873 873 873 837 837 
       




Table 7. Robustness to controlling for other bank characteristics 
In columns I and II the dependent variable is the  percentage of a given bank lending to risky firms. In 
columns III to V it is the percentage of a bank lending in dollar. In column V we focus on lending to risky 
borrowers. The sample covers 51 banks that have a significant participation in the European syndicated 
loans market. Crisis is a post Q2-2007 dummy. Bank characteristics are lagged one year. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table A3 of the online Appendix. Bank and year-quarter fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 I II III IV V 
Crisis*Non-Eurozone bank dummy 9.749  11.616  20.199 
 (4.128)**  (2.963)***  (4.659)*** 
Tier 1 capital ratio 1.270 1.459 -0.523 -0.610 -2.634 
 (1.636) (1.610) (0.950) (0.920) (1.326)** 
Crisis*Tier 1 capital ratio -2.561 -2.898 1.052 1.218 3.414 
 (1.353)* (1.383)** (0.970) (0.902) (1.144)*** 
Loans over deposits -0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.006 0.021 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Crisis*Loans over deposits 0.061 0.067 -0.010 -0.011 -0.026 
 (0.028)** (0.027)** (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
Loans over long term funding -0.748 -0.579 0.157 0.225 -0.033 
 (0.406)* (0.413) (0.315) (0.316) (0.344) 
Crisis*Loans over long term funding -0.242 0.170 -0.268 -0.203 -0.530 
 (0.281) (0.311) (0.322) (0.350) (0.442) 
Impaired loans over loans -0.039 -0.005 -0.022 -0.015 -0.019 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) 
Crisis*Impaired loans over loans -0.041 -0.100 -0.058 -0.056 -0.058 
 (0.104) (0.109) (0.074) (0.079) (0.074) 
Log total assets 1.528 1.566 -0.419 -0.286 -0.098 
 (0.631)** (0.643)** (0.483) (0.477) (0.683) 
Crisis*Log total assets -0.713 -0.930 1.099 0.887 1.108 
 (0.732) (0.744) (0.505)** (0.506)* (0.746) 
Crisis*US bank dummy  15.528  21.414  
  (6.580)**  (5.363)***  
Crisis*UK bank dummy  3.731  6.205  
  (5.228)  (3.493)*  
Crisis*Japenese bank dummy  -3.857  10.047  
  (6.389)  (5.940)*  
Crisis*Other banks  21.310  7.718  
  (7.920)***  (6.227)  
      
R2 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.30 
N 742 742 742 742 637 
       




Table 8. Shift to dollar: Heterogeneity across non-Eurozone banks  
The dependent variable is the  percentage of a given bank lending denominated in dollar. The sample 
covers non-Eurozone banks that have a significant participation in the European syndicated loans market. 
Crisis is a post Q2-2007 dummy. % Subsidiaries equals (subsidiaries/(subsidiaries+branches))*100. The 
Bank characteristics are lagged one year. Bank and year-quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors 
are clustered by bank. 
 
 I II 
 Total lending Lending to 
risky firms 
Crisis*% Subsidiaries -46.011 -57.184 
 (20.240)** (28.914)** 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.429 -1.842 
 (2.176) (2.957) 
Crisis*Tier 1 capital ratio 0.112 5.248 
 (2.170) (2.964)* 
Loans over deposits -0.158 -0.295 
 (0.174) (0.288) 
Crisis*Loans over deposits 0.061 -0.015 
 (0.107) (0.188) 
Loans over long term funding 1.239 -0.110 
 (1.018) (1.134) 
Crisis*Loans over long term funding -0.835 -0.660 
 (0.497)* (0.556) 
Impaired loans over loans -0.034 -0.070 
 (0.064) (0.076) 
Crisis*Impaired loans over loans -0.195 -0.053 
 (0.206) (0.222) 
Log total assets -0.637 -0.484 
 (1.042) (1.802) 
Crisis*Log total assets 1.819 2.239 
 (1.316) (2.243) 
   
R2 0.41 0.54 
N          275           227 






Table 9. Alternative hypothesis: heightened search for yield in credit from non-Eurozone banks 
The dependent variable is the cost of debt measured by the all-in-drawn spread to benchmark. The sample period is Q1-2004 to Q4-2009 and the 
variables are as defined in Table 4. All columns include firm fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects, and control for issue type fixed effects, 
issue size, maturity in months, and issue purpose. All columns also include the Eurozone-US policy rate differential interacted Risky, The euro-
dollar exchange rate change interacted with Risky, the Fed target interacted with Risky, the borrower home country credit demand index and its 
interaction with Risky, and the US credit demand index and its interaction with Risky. We exclude firm-quarters with zero debt issuance. Standard 
errors reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country*year. 
 
 I II 





Risky 1.050 3.626 
 (0.842) (0.936)*** 
CCI 0.020 0.027 
 (0.009)** (0.012)** 
CCI*Risky 0.043 0.089 
 (0.027) (0.034)** 
   
R2 0.08 0.45 
N 898 545 
 




Table 10. Funding markets disruptions and the shift to dollar 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for dollar borrowing in a given quarter. ERP is the euro risk premium (the difference between 3 month 
Euribor and equal maturity OIS euro) and DRP is the dollar risk premium (the difference between 3 month Libor USD and equal maturity OIS USD). The 
other variables are as defined in Table 4. All columns include firm fixed effects, the Eurozone-US policy rate differential and its interaction with Risky, the 
euro-dollar exchange rate change and its interaction with Risky, the Fed target and its interaction with Risky, the borrower home country credit demand 
index and its interaction with Risky, and the US credit demand index and its interaction with Risky. The data cover quarters when there is a positive net 
percentage of Eurozone banks that report having tightened lending standards to large firms in the previous 3 months. The data are quarterly for the period 






















* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 I II III IV 
    Including loans 
purpose fixed 
effects 
Risky 0.019 0.028 0.034 -0.020 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.058) 
ERP -0.053   0.015 
 (0.028)*   (0.026) 
ERP*Risky 0.174   0.147 
 (0.075)**   (0.055)** 
DRP  -0.005   
  (0.018)   
DRP*Risky  0.059   
  (0.036)   
Euro basis   -0.064  
   (0.035)*  
Euro basis*Risky   0.192  
   (0.094)**  
     
R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.11 






Table 11. The pass-through of funding costs to lending rates 
 
The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread to benchmark for Euro denominated loans. ERP is the 
euro risk premium (the difference between 3 month euribor and equal maturity OIS euro). The regressions 
include firm fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, log amount borrowed, loan purpose, and maturity 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country*year. The data cover quarters when 
there is a positive net percentage of Eurozone banks that report having tightened lending standards to large 
firms in the previous 3 months. The data are quarterly for the period 2004-Q1 to 2009-Q4. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 I II III 





Risky 3.038 0.076 0.254 
 (0.450)*** (1.007) (0.586) 
ERP*Risky 2.148 3.132 3.421 
 (0.795)*** (1.210)** (1.787)* 
R2 0.44 0.85 0.45 
N 585 264 321 




Table 12. Mitigating role of non-Eurozone banks I 
 
The dependent variable in column I is a dummy that indicates whether the firm has borrowed during the period Q3-2007 to Q4-2009. In columns II 
it is the average all-in-drawn spread to benchmark charged to a firm during Q3-2007 to Q4-2009 minus the spread it paid on its last pre-crisis loan.  
In column III the dependent variable is the average % of non-Eurozone banks’ participation in syndicated loans the firm issued during the period 
Q3-2007 to Q4-2009. OLS estimates are reported. Weak bank is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm’s last pre-crisis syndicate included a 
Eurozone lead bank that was resolved during the crisis.  The regressions include borrower country and industry fixed effects, and last pre-crisis 
loan characteristics: risk type, log amount borrowed, loan type, maturity, and year of issuance dummies. Further to control for demand for credit 
we include: a dummy for bond market access and a dummy indicating whether a debt matures during the crisis. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 I II III 
 
 Access Spread % non-
Eurozone 
banks 
Risky 0.061 -101.480 0.010 
 (0.032)* (93.483) (0.051) 
Weak bank 0.002 58.467 -0.008 
 (0.050) (23.345)** (0.020) 
Risky*Weak bank -0.106 238.909 0.103 
 (0.032)*** (122.501)* (0.035)** 
    
R2 0.18 0.25 0.39 
N       1806  261       390 




Table 13. Mitigating role of non-Eurozone banks II 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of employment for a given firm between 2008 and 2010. We report separate regressions for the full sample, the 
sample of risky firms (rated below investment grade), and the sample of not risky firms. Weak bank is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm’s last pre-crisis 
syndicate included a lead bank that was resolved during the crisis. % non-Eurozone banks is the percentage of non-Eurozone arrangers in the last pre-crisis 
syndicate. We include 2-digit SIC code fixed effects, log total assets, log firm age, and last pre-crisis loan characteristics: the spread, maturity, loan type, and 
year of issuance. Further, to control for demand for credit we include: a dummy for bond market access, a dummy indicating whether a debt is maturing 
during the crisis, the ratio of cash over total assets in 2007, and reliance on trade credit in 2007 (measured by accounts payable scaled by total sales). In 
columns VI and VII we instrument % non-Eurozone banks by the propensities of the last pre-crisis loan arranger(s) to co-syndicate with US, UK, Japanese, 
and other non-Eurozone banks during 2004-2013.  Errors are clustered by country. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
 Full Sample Risky Not Risky Risky Not Risky Risky Not Risky 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Risky 0.065       
 (0.053)       
Weak bank 0.011 -0.170 0.012 -0.238 0.040 -0.332 -0.040 
 (0.029) (0.049)*** (0.031) (0.071)*** (0.046) (0.105)*** (0.064) 
Risky*Weak bank -0.174       
 (0.050)***       
% non-Eurozone banks  0.079 0.043 -0.098 0.218 -0.226 -0.549 
  (0.055) (0.091) (0.125) (0.215) (0.170) (0.586) 
Weak bank*% non-Eurozone banks    0.229 -0.216 0.558 0.419 
    (0.116)* (0.250) (0.198)*** (0.519) 
        
First-stage F-statistic       58.06 10.38 
J-statistic p-value      0.33 0.54 
R2 0.11 0.38 0.11 0.39 0.11   
N 450 126 324 126 324 126 324 
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